This work analyzes how the internal point of view, which represents the perspective of the participant in the legal domain, can be understood within a Hartian framework. It critically examines how legal conventionalism has dealt with this issue. In particular, it criticizes the way in which contemporary conventionalists represent the perspective of participants in legal practice on the basis of cognitive mental states. It also criticizes the way in which they understand how the rule of recognition constitutes the practice. To (...) address these problems, a model based on the philosophy of recognition is presented, showing how its historicity and the way it understands conflict may help to represent the participants' perspective from a practical point of view. (shrink)

The EU proposal for the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) defines four risk categories: unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal. However, as these categories statically depend on broad fields of application of AI, the risk magnitude may be wrongly estimated, and the AIA may not be enforced effectively. This problem is particularly challenging when it comes to regulating general-purpose AI (GPAI), which has versatile and often unpredictable applications. Recent amendments to the compromise text, though introducing context-specific assessments, remain insufficient. To address this, (...) we propose applying the risk categories to specific AI scenarios, rather than solely to fields of application, using a risk assessment model that integrates the AIA with the risk approach arising from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and related literature. This model enables the estimation of the magnitude of AI risk by considering the interaction between (a) risk determinants, (b) individual drivers of determinants, and (c) multiple risk types. We use large language models (LLMs) as an example. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es presentar una reconstrucción de la teoría de los grupos dereferencia. La teoría, desarrollada por Robert K. Merton, ha sido largamente utilizada enlos más variados campos de las ciencias sociales, aunque con escasa o nula consideraciónmetateórica hasta ahora. La reconstrucción atenderá a la presentación que de la misma serecoge en sendos artículos de su libro Social Theory and Social Structure, de 1968, a saber:“Contributions to the theory of reference group behavior” y “Continuities in the theory (...) ofreference groups and social structure”. Para presentar esta reconstrucción me apoyaré en elinstrumental de la Metateoría Estructuralista. Después de una consideración informal de lateoría, serán presentados sus modelos potenciales, modelos, modelos potenciales parciales,sus aplicaciones intencionales y algunos comentarios acerca de la noción de “grupo de referencia”en lo que respeta su carácter relacional y disposicional. (shrink)

Accountability is a cornerstone of the governance of artificial intelligence (AI). However, it is often defined too imprecisely because its multifaceted nature and the sociotechnical structure of AI systems imply a variety of values, practices, and measures to which accountability in AI can refer. We address this lack of clarity by defining accountability in terms of answerability, identifying three conditions of possibility (authority recognition, interrogation, and limitation of power), and an architecture of seven features (context, range, agent, forum, standards, process, (...) and implications). We analyse this architecture through four accountability goals (compliance, report, oversight, and enforcement). We argue that these goals are often complementary and that policy-makers emphasise or prioritise some over others depending on the proactive or reactive use of accountability and the missions of AI governance. (shrink)

Although we may find the concept of anomie in Greek thought, it is since Durkheim that the concept begins to be used specifically as a sociological concept. However, a theory of anomie only becomes consolidated since “Social Structure and Anomie” by Robert K. Merton (Merton 1938). The theory becomes important and conquers its space in the rest of the century as one of the most productive theories about deviance. In this study, based on a contemporary conception of scientific theory, that (...) of the structuralist metatheory, a reconstruction of Merton’s approach is proposed, allowing to make explicit the deep structure of the theory. (shrink)

The EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) defines four risk categories for AI systems: unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal. However, it lacks a clear methodology for the assessment of these risks in concrete situations. Risks are broadly categorized based on the application areas of AI systems and ambiguous risk factors. This paper suggests a methodology for assessing AI risk magnitudes, focusing on the construction of real-world risk scenarios. To this scope, we propose to integrate the AIA with a framework developed by (...) the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and related literature. This approach enables a nuanced analysis of AI risk by exploring the interplay between (a) risk determinants, (b) individual drivers of determinants, and (c) multiple risk types. We further refine the proposed methodology by applying a proportionality test to balance the competing values involved in AI risk assessment. Finally, we present three uses of this approach under the AIA: to implement the Regulation, to assess the significance of risks, and to develop internal risk management systems for AI deployers. (shrink)

The idea that qualities can be had partly or to an intermediate degree is controversial among contemporary metaphysicians, but also has a considerable pedigree among philosophers and scientists. In this paper, we first aim to show that metaphysical sense can be made of this idea by proposing a partial taxonomy of metaphysical accounts of graded qualities, focusing on three particular approaches: one which explicates having a quality to a degree in terms of having a property with an in-built degree, another (...) based on the idea that instantiation admits of degrees, and a third which derives the degree to which a quality is had from the aspects of multi-dimensional properties. Our second aim is to demonstrate that the choice between these accounts can make a substantial metaphysical difference. To make this point, we rely on two case studies (involving quantum observables and values) in which we apply the accounts in order to model apparent cases of metaphysical gradedness. (shrink)

Regulation is nothing without enforcement. This particularly holds for the dynamic field of emerging technologies. Hence, this article has two ambitions. First, it explains how the EU´s new Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) will be implemented and enforced by various institutional bodies, thus clarifying the governance framework of the AIA. Second, it proposes a normative model of governance, providing recommendations to ensure uniform and coordinated execution of the AIA and the fulfilment of the legislation. Taken together, the article explores how the (...) AIA may be implemented by national and EU institutional bodies, encompassing longstanding bodies, such as the European Commission, and those newly established under the AIA, such as the AI Office. It investigates their roles across supranational and national levels, emphasizing how EU regulations influence institutional structures and operations. These regulations may not only directly dictate the structural design of institutions but also indirectly request administrative capacities needed to enforce the AIA. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la noción de amor en la filosofía de Spinoza a través del Tratado de la reforma del entendimiento, el Tratado breve y la Ética. El amor en Spinoza debe contextualizarse en su fenomenología crítica de los afectos y su teoría del conocimiento. Así es posible mostrar que, para Spinoza, cómo se ama —activa o pasivamente— es más importante que una distinción normativa entre objetos de amor correctos o incorrectos. Esta interpretación sobre el amor en Spinoza es coherente (...) con las premisas éticas y el monismo ontológico de su filosofía, y con su afirmación de que el amor es también una actividad de la Sustancia. (shrink)

Desde una respuesta tentativa a la pregunta qué es una imagen se busca establecer el modo en que pensamos en, con y contra las imágenes. Se concentra la indagación en dos tipos particulares de imágenes, las generadas por el aparato digital, con el fin de articular conceptualmente el modo en que las imágenes cobran sentido y cómo dicho sentido surge desde el estatuto ontológico que encierra dicho aparato en particular. Desde una respuesta operativa y desde el concepto de modo de (...) imaginar se propone que el modo de pensar en, con y contra las imágenes es una disputa política por controlar el modo de aparecer en las imágenes, es decir, por el control del plano estético y ontológico que encierra dicho aparecer. Dicha disputa política en el aparato digital se instala contemporáneamente en torno al objeto fascista de la representación. (shrink)

Será tarea del pensamiento crítico recuperar la imagen para un discurso de la resistencia como un discurso efectivo frente a la inoperancia del objeto artístico difuso. A esto debe convocar al análisis crítico de la imagen hegemonizada por la superficie-referente. La radicalidad de dicha tarea debe buscar sus fuentes en el desplazamiento constante hacia la descripción de lo opaco en la estrategia representacional de una superficie-referente para la instalación del objeto fascista estetizante. Dicha radicalidad debe recuperar conceptualmente el desmantelamiento crítico (...) para la reapropiación de la imagen, de lo visual; debe desactivar la radicalidad de lo espectacular. Este análisis de la superficie-referente en la retórica radical del objeto fascista representacional es la tarea necesaria para situar adecuadamente una crítica que se distancie de dicha retórica que no hace más que tornar al objeto representado en un objeto estetizante y fascista en su exceso de real. La resistencia debe centrarse en el análisis permanente de una imagen en constante readecuación al interior de la lógica global del capitalismo. Cualquier nueva articulación de las humanidades debe atender, primero que nada, a la pregunta por cuál es el estatuto de lo visual en dicha lógica antes de emprender cualquier definición de cómo se deben conformar los discursos de resistencia. Es tarea e intento de este trabajo situar la descripción de las estrategias de la imagen en tiempos de su hiper- reproductibilidad- técnica antes de cualquier replanteamiento de las humanidades, esto para comprender cuáles son propiamente las retóricas de lo radical en el capitalismo cultural. (Párrafo extraído del texto a modo de resumen). (shrink)

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to highlight the aesthetic layout created by the digital device in the ontological autonomy of the digital representation. As a result, in the digital screen, as a simulated immersive area, the object is alienated through the hyper-representation of a hyper-reproduction: a hyper-reproduction which causes the data and its image to be the monadic support that multiplies it in always livable creases by interactivity. A digitally-represented world would become the ultimate alienation of the modern (...) representational area in terms of excess of closeness. Thus, this question would cause the simulacral strategy of post-modernity through its digitization. -/- Resumen: Este artículo se propone evidenciar, en la autonomía ontológica de la representación digital, la disposición estética abierta por el dispositivo digital. Como consecuencia, en la pantalla digital, en cuanto super cie inmersiva simu- lacral, se logra enajenar el objeto por medio de la hiper-representación de una hiper-reproductibilidad. Una hiper-reproductibilidad que hace del data y su «ima- gen» el sustento monádico que lo multiplica en pliegues siempre habitables por la interactividad. El mundo representado digitalmente se haría «espectáculo» de la enajenación de nitiva de la super cie representacional moderna en cuanto exceso de cercanía. Cuestión que provocaría la estrategia simulacral de la modernidad en lo postmoderno por medio de su digitalización. (shrink)

We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated.

This chapter examines the evolving debate on AI legal personhood, emphasizing the role of path dependencies in shaping current trajectories and prospects. Two primary path dependencies emerge: prevailing legal theories on personhood (singularist vs. clustered) and the impact of technological advancements. We argue that these factors dynamically interact, with technological optimism fostering broader rights-based debates and periods of skepticism narrowing discussions to limited rights. Additional influences include regulatory cross-linkages (e.g., data privacy, liability, cybersecurity) and historical legal precedents. Current regulatory frameworks, (...) particularly in the EU, generally resist extending legal personhood to AI systems. Case law suggests that without explicit legislation, courts are unlikely to grant AI legal personhood on their own. For this to happen, AI systems would first need to prove de facto legitimacy through sustained social participation. The chapter concludes by assessing near- and long-term prospects, from generative AI and AI agents in the next 5–20 years to transformative possibilities such as AI integration with human cognition via Brain-Machine Interfaces in a more distant future. (shrink)

This chapter explores the influence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on digital democracy, focusing on four main areas: citizenship, participation, representation, and the public sphere. It traces the evolution from electronic to virtual and network democracy, underscoring how each stage has broadened democratic engagement through technology. Focusing on digital citizenship, the chapter examines how AI can improve online engagement while posing privacy risks and fostering identity stereotyping. Regarding political participation, it highlights AI's dual role in mobilising civic actions and spreading misinformation. (...) Regarding representation, AI's involvement in electoral processes can enhance voter registration, e-voting, and the efficiency of result tabulation but raises concerns regarding privacy and public trust. Also, AI's predictive capabilities shift the dynamics of political competition, posing ethical questions about manipulation and the legitimacy of democracy. Finally, the chapter examines how integrating AI and digital technologies can facilitate democratic political advocacy and personalised communication. However, this also comes with higher risks of misinformation and targeted propaganda. (shrink)

In two occasions a Bibliography of Structuralism has been published in Erkenntnis (1989, 1994). Since then a lot of water has flowed under the bridge and the structuralist program has shown a continuous development. The aim of the present bibliography is to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the publication of An Architectonic for Science –structuralism’s main reference work– and of its recent translation into Spanish by updating the previous bibliographies with titles which have appeared since 1994 as well as before (...) that year but which are not included in them. As in the former deliveries, this bibliography only covers books and articles that are concerned directly with the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. We would like to thank the many colleagues who have helped us in collecting all the information. Notwithstanding we apologize in advance for the possible entries that we missed to include in this third Bibliography of Structuralism. (shrink)

One might suppose that Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) is inhospitable to metaphysial indeterminacy (MI), given that, as A. Wilson (2020) puts it, "the central idea of EQM is to replace indeterminacy with multiplicity" (77). But as Wilson goes on to suggest, the popular decoherence-based understanding of EQM (henceforth: DEQM) appears to admit of indeterminacy in both world number and world nature, where the latter indeterminacy---our focus here---is plausibly metaphysical. After a brief presentation of DEQM (S1), we bolster the case for (...) there being MI in world nature in DEQM (S2). The remainder of the paper is devoted to a comparative assessment of the two main approaches to MI for purposes of accommodating this MI---namely, a metaphysical supervaluationist approach (as per Barnes and Williams 2011) and a determinable-based approach (as per Wilson 2013 and Calosi and Wilson 2018 and 2021). We briefly describe each approach (S3), then offer arguments in favour of a determinable-based approach to world nature MI in DEQM (S4). (shrink)

This article explores how externalism about reasons for action contributes to understanding the relations between agents and norms. In order to do this, firstly, the distinction between internalism and externalism is presented; secondly, some flaws of internalism regarding the objectivity of duties are analysed; lastly, externalism is defend-ed from the criticism according to which the principle «ought implies can» cannot be explained.

The development and deployment of chatbot technology, while spanning decades and employing different techniques, require innovative frameworks to understand and interrogate their functionality and implications. A mere technocentric account of the evolution of chatbot technology does not fully illuminate how conversational systems are embedded in societal dynamics. This study presents a structured examination of chatbots across three societal dimensions, highlighting their roles as objects of scientific research, commercial instruments, and agents of intimate interaction. Through furnishing a dimensional framework for the (...) evolution of conversational systems — from laboratories to marketplaces to private lives— this article contributes to the wider scholarly inquiry of chatbot technology and its impact in lived human experiences and dynamics. (shrink)

Cancel culture is a form of societal self-defense that becomes prominent particularly during periods of substantial moral upheaval. It can lead to the polarization of incompatible viewpoints if it is indiscriminately demonized. In this brief editorial letter, I consider framing cancel culture as an essentially contested concept (ECC), according to the theory of Walter B. Gallie, with the aim of establishing a groundwork for a more productive discourse on it. In particular, I propose that intermediate agreements and principles of reasonableness (...) can help refocus the debate on cancel culture towards democratic discourse, without blanket justification for every instance. In this context, asserting that cancel culture is an ECC does not dismiss the potential of achieving consensus on its shared core meaning or societal role. Like other similar ECCs, such as democracy or rule of law, it highlights the importance of contestations in shaping our collective understanding of the concept. (shrink)

The article argues that AI can enhance the measurement and implementation of democratic processes within political parties, known as Intra-Party Democracy (IPD). It identifies the limitations of traditional methods for measuring IPD, which often rely on formal parameters, self-reported data, and tools like surveys. Such limitations lead to partial data collection, rare updates, and significant resource demands. To address these issues, the article suggests that specific data management and Machine Learning techniques, such as natural language processing and sentiment analysis, can (...) improve the measurement and practice of IPD. (shrink)

The complexity and emergent autonomy of Generative AI systems introduce challenges in predictability and legal compliance. This paper analyses some of the legal and regulatory implications of such challenges in the European Union context, focusing on four areas: liability, privacy, intellectual property, and cybersecurity. It examines the adequacy of the existing and proposed EU legislation, including the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), in addressing the challenges posed by Generative AI in general and LLMs in particular. The paper identifies potential gaps and (...) shortcomings in the EU legislative framework and proposes recommendations to ensure the safe and compliant deployment of generative models. (shrink)

Th e contemporary right to freedom of thought together with all its further declinations into freedom of speech, religion, conscience and expression, had one of its earliest historical recognitions at the end of the Wars of Religion with the Edict of Nantes (1598). In several respects one can saythat the right to freedom of thought is virtually “co-original” with the endof the Wars of Religion. Following this thought further, one might think that human rights defi ne the boundaries of our (...) social coexistence and are inextricably connected to the “fact” of cultural pluralism. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy has recently addressed the set-theoretic multiverse, and expressed reservations on its status and merits ([Maddy, 2017]). The purpose of the paper is to examine her concerns, by using the interpretative framework of set-theoretic naturalism. I first distinguish three main forms of 'multiversism', and then I proceed to analyse Maddy's concerns. Among other things, I take into account salient aspects of multiverse-related mathematics , in particular, research programmes in set theory for which the use of the multiverse seems to (...) be crucial, and show how one may provide responses to Maddy's concerns based on a careful analysis of 'multiverse practice'. (shrink)

Presentazione del curatore italiano (C.Corradetti): È possibile conciliare il pluralismo culturale con la dimensione pubblica della deliberazione? Partendo dall’analisi critica di Rawls e Habermas, James Bohman offre una risposta innovativa alla questione dell’accordo democratico. In tale proposta, parallelamente al rigetto di soluzioni meramente strategiche, viene riabilitata la nozione di compromesso morale nel quadro di un accordo normativo. Mantenendo fede ad una prospettiva composta da elementi normativi e fattuali, l’autore si propone di ampliare le opportunità democratiche nella riconciliazione tra conflitti culturali (...) profondi propri delle società contemporanee. L’elemento civico partecipativo risulta essere dunque una componente essenziale per la produzione di una sfera pubblica vibrante. Ne emerge una ricostruzione convincente volta non solo a respingere le critiche degli scettici sulle reali possibilità d’inclusività democratica, ma diretta soprattutto a suggerire un più efficace modello deliberativo per la garanzia della stabilità sociale. Questo testo è diventato ormai un riferimento internazionale classico nella discussione sul tema della deliberazione pubblica. L’autore ha inoltre sviluppato in ambito post-nazionale il suo modello deliberativo senza tuttavia ridiscutere i fondamenti concettuali della sua proposta teorica qui enunciati.Vista la rilevanza del tema e considerata la centralità del testo proposto, sembrerebbe dunque auspicabile rendere il testo disponibile anche al lettore italiano. (shrink)

In recent years, several strategies have been proposed to tackle social controversies about topics in which science is settled, among which one of the most influential is that of Elizabeth Anderson, who argues that any lay person with access to the Internet and basic education can reliably assess the acceptability of various claims involving expert knowledge. In particular, the author shows that this procedure can be successfully applied to the case of anthropogenic global warming. In this article we will try (...) to argue why, even if we concede that Anderson's proposal is satisfactory in that particular case, it fails to generalize when applied to other controversies. In this article, we illustrate it with the cases of flat-Eartherism and anti-vaxxerism. (shrink)

This article examines the application of the ought‐implies‐can principle in the legal domain, especially in the relationship between obligations and responsibility. It addresses the challenge of cases in which an agent cannot do what is required of her, and yet it seems plausible to say that she has an obligation. To deal with these cases, two parallel distinctions are made: between rules of conduct and rules of imputation, and between doings and things done. It is proposed that these distinctions show (...) that the principle operates in two different but complementary ways: as part of prescriptive relations and as part of responsibility practices. (shrink)

L’articolo esamina la proposta europea di regolamento sull’intelligenza artificiale, AI Act (AIA). In particolare, esamina il modello di analisi e valutazione del rischio dei sistemi di IA. L’articolo identifica tre potenziali problemi di implementazione del regolamento: (1) la predeterminazione dei livelli di rischio, (2) la genericità del giudizio di significatività del rischio e (3) l’indeterminatezza della valutazione sull’impatto dei diritti fondamentali. Il saggio suggeriscealcune soluzioni per affrontare questi tre problemi.

El artículo plantea relaciones entre la subjetividad contemporánea y la hiperconectividad. Empezaremos indagando los rasgos principales del homo psychologicus burgués y de su esfera privada como articuladora de una autenticidad interior. A continuación, identificaremos algunas transformaciones que la hiperconectividad y ciertos repertorios culturales ocasionaron en una subjetividad contemporánea que, a diferencia de su antecesora, parece constituirse en la exteriorización, la visibilidad y la transparencia de la extimidad. Para ello nos apoyaremos en la noción de Baudrillard del éxtasis de la comunicación (...) como “extroversión de la interioridad” e “inyección de la exterioridad”. Intentaremos identificar algunas contradicciones de la subjetividad contemporánea y de las prácticas y tecnologías del yo que la constituyen en el contexto actual de hiperconectividad. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relation between the synthesis of reproduction in imagination and the schematism. It is known that the synthesis of reproduction, according to Kant, can be considered as the transcendental imagination itself. Hence, if we take the transcendental imagination as the source of the schema, it is necessary to understand how the relation between the schema and the synthesis takes place.

We propose a formal framework to examine the relationship between models and observations. To make our analysis precise,models are reduced to first-order theories that represent both terminological knowledge – e.g., the laws that are supposed to regulate the domain under analysis and that allow for explanations, predictions, and simulations – and assertional knowledge – e.g., information about specific entities in the domain of interest. Observations are introduced into the domain of quantification of a distinct first-order theory that describes their nature (...) and their organization and takes track of the way they are experimentally acquired or intentionally elaborated. A model mainly represents the theoretical knowledge or hypotheses on a domain, while the theory of observations mainly represents the empirical knowledge and the given experimental practices. We propose a precise identity criterion for observations and we explore different links between models and observations by assuming a degree of independence between them. By exploiting some techniques developed in the field of social choice theory and judgment aggregation, we sketch some strategies to solve inconsistencies between a given set of observations and the assumed theoretical hypotheses. The solutions of these inconsistencies can impact both the observations – e.g., the theoretical knowledge and the analysis of the way observations are collected or produced may highlight some unreliable sources – and the models – e.g. empirical evidences may invalidate some theoretical laws. (shrink)

Fragmentalism was originally introduced as a new A-theory of time. It was further refined and discussed, and different developments of the original insight have been proposed. In a celebrated paper, Jonathan Simon contends that fragmentalism delivers a new realist account of the quantum state—which he calls conservative realism—according to which: the quantum state is a complete description of a physical system, the quantum state is grounded in its terms, and the superposition terms are themselves grounded in local goings-on about the (...) system in question. We will argue that fragmentalism, at least along the lines proposed by Simon, does not offer a new, satisfactory realistic account of the quantum state. This raises the question about whether there are some other viable forms of quantum fragmentalism. (shrink)

In texts such as “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” Jürgen Habermas defends a theory that associates, on the one hand, the truth-claim raised by a speaker for a proposition p with, on the other hand, the requirement that p be “defendable on the basis of good reasons […] at any time and against anybody”. This, as is known, has been the target of criticisms by Rorty, who−in spite of agreeing with Habermas on the central tenet that the way of evaluating our (...) beliefs must be argumentative practice−declares that the only “ideal presupposed by discourse” is “that of being able to justify your beliefs to a competent audience”. We will consider two texts from 1971, -surprisingly neglected in most approaches to the debate-, in which Habermas did include such a “competence condition” to elucidate the notion of truth. We will discuss whether there are good reasons to relinquish such a condition and to refer, instead, only to the formal or procedural properties of argumentative exchanges, as Habermas does in presenting the notion of “ideal speech situation”. As we will try to argue, there are no such good reasons. (shrink)

Gödel’s philosophical conceptions bear striking similarities to Cantor’s. Although there is no conclusive evidence that Gödel deliberately used or adhered to Cantor’s views, one can successfully reconstruct and see his “Cantorianism” at work in many parts of his thought. In this paper, I aim to describe the most prominent conceptual intersections between Cantor’s and Gödel’s thought, particularly on such matters as the nature and existence of mathematical entities (sets), concepts, Platonism, the Absolute Infinite, the progress and inexhaustibility of mathematics.

We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated.

The principle of the common cause claims that if an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist a common cause. This is generally taken to mean that positive correlations between non-causally related events should disappear when conditioning on the action of some underlying common cause. The extended interpretation of the principle, by contrast, urges that common causes should be called for in order to explain positive deviations between the estimated correlation of two events and the expected value of their correlation. (...) The aim of this paper is to provide the extended reading of the principle with a general probabilistic model, capturing the simultaneous action of a system of multiple common causes. To this end, two distinct models are elaborated, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence are determined. (shrink)

Forests, cars and orchestras are very different ontological entities, and yet very similar in some aspects. The relationships they have with the elements they are composed of is often assumed to be reducible to standard ontological relations, like parthood and constitution, but how this could be done is still debated. This paper sheds light on the issue starting from a linguistic and philosophical analysis aimed at understanding notions like plurality, collective and composite, and propos- ing a formal approach to characterise (...) them. We conclude the presentation with a discussion and analysis of social groups within this framework. (shrink)

The Hyperuniverse Programme, introduced in Arrigoni and Friedman (2013), fosters the search for new set-theoretic axioms. In this paper, we present the procedure envisaged by the programme to find new axioms and the conceptual framework behind it. The procedure comes in several steps. Intrinsically motivated axioms are those statements which are suggested by the standard concept of set, i.e. the `maximal iterative concept', and the programme identi fies higher-order statements motivated by the maximal iterative concept. The satisfaction of these statements (...) (H-axioms) in countable transitive models, the collection of which constitutes the `hyperuniverse' (H), has remarkable 1st-order consequences, some of which we review in section 5. (shrink)

Las relaciones familiares tienen una cualidad única que no se producen en otros entornos y cada familia vive diferentes prácticas que la hacen ser irrepetible; esto permite un aprender–aprender como padres e hijos, además estás relaciones tienen correspondencia con el desarrollo de los valores que se manifiesta en familia y que finalmente son transmitidos en la sociedad. La investigación se realizó a nivel nacional a 1200 niños y niñas en edades comprendidas entre 8 a 11 años, pudiendo observar con más (...) influencia de valores a la responsabilidad, amistad, orden, religiosidad y naturaleza. (shrink)

One determining characteristic of contemporary sociopolitical systems is their power over increasingly large and diverse populations. This raises questions about power relations between heterogeneous individuals and increasingly dominant and homogenizing system objectives. This article crosses epistemic boundaries by integrating computer engineering and a historicalphilosophical approach making the general organization of individuals within large-scale systems and corresponding individual homogenization intelligible. From a versatile archeological-genealogical perspective, an analysis of computer and social architectures is conducted that reinterprets Foucault’s disciplines and political anatomy to (...) establish the notion of politics for a purely technical system. This permits an understanding of system organization as modern technology with application to technical and social systems alike. Connecting to Heidegger’s notions of the enframing (Gestell) and a more primal truth (anfänglicheren Wahrheit), the recognition of politics in differently developing systems then challenges the immutability of contemporary organization. Following this critique of modernity and within the conceptualization of system organization, Derrida’s democracy to come (à venir) is then reformulated more abstractly as organizations to come. Through the integration of the discussed concepts, the framework of Large-Scale Systems Composed of Homogeneous Individuals (LSSCHI) is proposed, problematizing the relationships between individuals, structure, activity, and power within large-scale systems. The LSSCHI framework highlights the conflict of homogenizing system-level objectives and individual heterogeneity, and outlines power relations and mechanisms of control shared across different social and technical systems. (shrink)

L’Ipotesi del Continuo, formulata da Cantor nel 1878, è una delle congetture più note della teoria degli insiemi. Il Problema del Continuo, che ad essa è collegato, fu collocato da Hilbert, nel 1900, fra i principali problemi insoluti della matematica. A seguito della dimostrazione di indipendenza dell’Ipotesi del Continuo dagli assiomi della teoria degli insiemi, lo status attuale del problema è controverso. In anni più recenti, la ricerca di una soluzione del Problema del Continuo è stata anche una delle ragioni (...) fondamentali per la ricerca di nuovi assiomi in matematica. L’articolo fornisce un quadro generale dei risultati matematici fondamentali, e un’analisi di alcune delle questioni filosofiche connesse al Problema del Continuo. (shrink)

This article discusses Rik Peels's response to Williams's argument against voluntary belief. Williams argues that voluntary beliefs must be acquired independently of truth-considerations, so they cannot count as beliefs after all, since beliefs aim at truth. Peels attempted to reply by showing that in cases of self-fulfilling beliefs, a belief can indeed be voluntarily acquired in conditions which retain the necessary truth-orientation. But even if we make two crucial concessions to Peels’s proposal, his argument ultimately fails. The first concession is (...) that beliefs can be weakly voluntary-namely, we can acquire them at will though we do not preserve them at will but on the basis of evidence. Conceding this, however, only lands us in the “acquisition problem”: how a belief can be acquired qua belief when we still do not think we have justification for it. This leads us to the second concession: that knowing in advance that a certain belief is self-fulfilling provides us with such a justification. However, this concession lands us in the ultimate obstacle: that, precisely because such a justification is available both before and at the moment of forming the belief, the cognitive perspective of the subject is identical at both moments, which obscures what it even means to say that at a certain moment she started to have a belief. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide an analysis of the concept of legal personality and discuss whether personality may be conferred on artificial intelligence systems (AIs). Legal personality will be presented as a doctrinal category that holds together bundles of rights and obligations; as a result, we first frame it as a node of inferential links between factual preconditions and legal effects. However, this inferentialist reading does not account for the ‘background reasons’ of legal personality, i.e., it does not explain why (...) we cluster different situations under this doctrinal category and how extra-legal information is integrated into it. We argue that one way to account for this background is to adopt a neoinstitutional perspective and to update the ontology of legal concepts with a further layer, the meta-institutional one. We finally argue that meta-institutional concepts can also support us in finding an equilibrium around the legal-policy choices that are involved in including (or not including) AIs among legal persons. (shrink)

It does not seem particularly daring to say that one objective of science education is to enable students to understand different phenomena in the world in their mutual relationship. This is roughly equivalent to promoting knowledge of scientific explanations, which involve resorting to regular relationships between certain phenomena and which, certainly, is different from knowledge of this or that type of event taken in isolation. In this text, we will draw attention to two opposing tendencies that, however, tend towards the (...) common result of hindering the achievement of such an objective. On the one hand, we find characterizations of scientific explanation that assimilate it to argumentation and, therefore, lose sight of what specifically makes explanations explanatory; that is, they ask too little of a scientific explanation. On the other hand, those that consider paradigmatic cases of scientific explanation −such as those achieved by subsuming phenomena such as tides to Newton's laws− do not really constitute explanations but merely descriptions; it is about asking too much of an explanation here. We will therefore point out that a greater attention to the elaborations provided by the philosophy of science about the notion of explanation is crucial to better serve educational purposes. (shrink)

This article analyses some theses developed by John Gardner that deal with the relations between different concepts of responsibility and how these are useful for understanding the relationships between agency, reasons, and responsibility practises. In the first two sections, the text introduces the Aristotelian view developed by John Gardner, focussing on how he understood the relationships between the concepts of basic responsibility, consequential responsibility and prospective responsibility. Sections III. and IV. then review two challenges that arise from the author's treatment (...) of the concept of basic responsibility. The first is the difficulty of understanding some types of responsibility and the second is how we can make sense of the role of excuses in our responsibility practises. Finally, some philosophical tools that Gardner developed in his last works are presented in order to deal with those challenges. / -/- This is a preprint version. (shrink)

To Wittgenstein’s late thought is often attributed a form of cultural or epistemic relativism, according to which truths are relative to the criteria of justification valid within a linguistic community. This paper aims to show that this attribution lies largely on a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas on the relation between language-games and forms of life. In the first section are presented the grounds for some relativist readings of Wittgenstein’s thought. In the second section, through the analysis of some passages of (...) the Tractatus and On Certainty, it is argued that, although Wittgenstein insisted on the “ungroundedness” of our language-games, he did not mean that any epistemic attitude, as long as it is endorsed by a community, is as valid as any other one. Rather, it is possible to show that some games better apply to our world and appear thus as more objective, so that there can be a difference in the validity of world-picures, contrary to what the epistemic relativist holds. In the third and final section, it is claimed that the different communities that appear in Wittgenstein’s examples are not actual or existing alternative possibilities, but an imaginary anthropology that Wittgenstein uses to enlighten how we, humans, work with our language-games. So, it is not possible to attribute him the idea that different games underly different forms of life, as some relativist authors do. It is concluded that Wittgenstein was not likely to be a cultural relativist. (shrink)